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Abstract
This paper aims to contribute to the normative economic analysis of merger
control by taking into account the possible eﬃciency gains for the design of struc-
tural merger remedies. We show that a larger asset transfer should be requested
from a less eﬃcient merged firm than from a more eﬃcient one, which conforms
with the recommendations of competition policy practitioners. However, since
cost savings are private information of merging firms, the Competition Authority
will require them to reveal their eﬃciency gains, so as to tailor the optimal rem-
edy. We propose a revelation mechanism combining the use of divestitures with
the regulation of their sale price. We discuss the opportunity of such a merger
policy tool, and argue that in practice it may be used to signal the eﬃciency gains
of notified mergers.
Keywords: merger control, structural merger remedies, asymmetric informa-
tion
JEL: D82, L41
Résumé
Cet article propose une analyse normative du contrôle des fusions qui prend
en compte les gaisn d’eﬃcacité générés par la concentration pour la détermination
des remèdes structurels. On montre que la cession d’actifs requise sera supérieure
dans le cas d’une fusion générant moins de synergies. En asymétrie d’information,
l’autorité de la concurrence doit faire révéler les gains d’eﬃcacité pour pouvoir
exiger des transferts d’actifs proportionnels aux dommages concurrentiels. Le
mécanisme de révélation proposé est basé sur la réglementation du prix de vente
des actifs transférés. L’utilité de cet outil de révélation justifie une reflexion
approfondie des autorités de la cocncurrence sur le processus de vente d’actifs lors
de l’application des remèdes structurels.
Mots-clé: contrôle des fusions, remèdes structurels, information asymétrique
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1. Introduction
Faced with a potentially anticompetitive merger, the Competition Authority
(CA) has basically the choice among three alternatives: rejecting it, accepting it
if the eﬃciency gains are overwhelming, or accepting it provided that corrective
remedies are adopted. A recent study of the European Commission DG Comp1
counted no less than 190 concentrations cleared with commitments from a total
of 2469 mergers since the introduction of the European Merger Regulation in
1990. It might look like a small number, but a closer look at the Commission’s
statistics reveals that remedies mostly apply to important mergers2. Moreover,
about 80% of those commitments address horizontal concerns. Divestitures, i.e.
structural remedies, are typically employed for horizontal mergers, and account
for more than 60% of all remedies. Structural remedies are thought to be easier
to apply than behavioral ones, since they change the allocation of property rights
within the industry, and therefore need no monitoring once implemented. Yet,
their application and eﬀects have often been subject to questioning, because "the
fashioning of merger remedies is not materially governed by case law[...]" and
therefore "is subject to standards that are not well-defined or consistent" (see
Blumenthal (2001)).
To begin with, this paper aims to contribute to the economic analysis of struc-
tural merger remedies by taking into account the possible eﬃciency gains for
the design of divestitures. Our model formalizes the intuition of a link between
the amount of eﬃciency gains that the merging partners can achieve and the
amount of assets they will have to divest for the merger to be accepted. Such an
idea is in line with the current consensus among competition policy practitioners,
according to which the required divestiture should neither exceed the net com-
petitive harm caused by the merger, nor prove insuﬃcient to correct it (that is,
both overfixing and underfixing should be avoided3). Consequently, the required
divestiture should obey the proportionality principle, meaning a larger transfer
1Merger Remedies Study, European Commission, DG Comp, October 2005, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/index_en.html
2Suggestive examples for such mergers, cleared with commitments under the new European
Merger Regulation 139/2004 are Pernod Ricard - Allied Domecq, Sanofi - Aventis, Alcan -
Pechiney.
3See for instance the Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, by the U.S.
Department of Justice, October 2004, and the Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98,
OJEC, C68, 2.3.2001.
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being requested from a less eﬃcient merged firm than from a more eﬃcient one.
The important consequence is that in order to tailor the optimal remedy, the CA
needs to learn the eﬃciency gains generated by the merger, which are private
information for the merger partners.
Thus, the second objective of the paper is to shed light on the design of opti-
mal structural divestitures when merging firms are better informed than the CA
with respect to the synergy level of the merger. The U. S. Merger Guidelines
acknowledge that "mergers have the potential to generate significant eﬃciencies",
but warn at the same time that "eﬃciencies are diﬃcult to verify and quantify,
in part because much of the information relating to eﬃciencies is uniquely in the
possession of the merging firms"4.
Competition authorities do try to extract this private information. A possible
"approach in screening mergers would be to implement a revelation mechanism
through the institution of merger license fees to be paid to the government", as
Röller et al. (2000) suggested. An alternative powerful way to extract private
information on eﬃciency gains is quoted by Brodley (1996), who reminds that
unfounded eﬃciency claims may be deterred by bonding procedures. He provides
the suggestive American example of the Pennsylvania versus Providence Health
Sys., Inc. case5, where the consent decree negotiated between the Pennsylvania
Attorney General and the undertakings provided that if argued eﬃciencies do not
translate into net cost savings directly passed on to consumers five years later, the
merging parties engaged to pay to the Treasury the shortfall from the claimed ef-
ficiency gains. This solution is nevertheless subject to the specific critique against
behavioral remedies, concerning the ex-post monitoring cost.
We do not formalize here the implications of such a "put-up-or-shut-up" clause.
In turn, we model a competition authority requiring the merging firms to reveal
eﬃciency gains so as to tailor the optimal structural remedy. We propose a revela-
tion mechanism combining the use of divestitures with the regulation of their sale
prices. We supply as a matter of fact a possible answer to the following question:
"What role, if any, should a competition authority play in the pricing of assets to
be divested?"6.
For the time being, Competition Authorities do not tamper with the sale price
4See the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/horiz_book/4.html
5See O’Connor, FTC Hearings, "Eﬃciencies: Should Current Antitrust Policy Be
Changed?" November 7,1995, availbale at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-
antitrust/eﬃciencies.pdf
6See OECD report on Merger Remedies, DAF/COMP(2004)21, December 2004, p.33.
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of the divested assets. However, in this paper we intend to check the relevance
of a regulated sale price as a possible screening device, even if this item rather
belongs to a regulator’s instruments. As a matter of fact, merger control is typi-
cally a mixed area of antitrust and regulation, where the Competition Authority
is supposed to directly impact on the market structure by rejecting anticompet-
itive mergers (see Motta et al. (2002)). Besides, since divestitures alone may
not suﬃce to screen merger proposals, it is natural to look for complementary
screening devices that might prove eﬀective. Note that as far as merger control
is concerned, the scope of instruments employed has constantly increased. For
instance, the very structural remedies themselves represent a rather recent instru-
ment introduced in the 70s by the FTC7. In addition, whenever the CA appoints a
trustee to implement the divestitures it requires, merger control comes close to an
indirect determination of the price of divested assets: according to the European
Merger Regulation8, the trustee may apply the fire-sale clause and organize the
sale of the divested assets without a minimum price, subject only to the Com-
mission’s approval. After all, though in a diﬀerent context, the CA would rather
interfere with the price setting process, although maybe not quite ready to do it:
indeed, in the battle to force Microsoft to open up the market for media-playing
software, the European Commission may not yet be likely to order a lower price
for Windows without Media Player, even if it does ponder it9. Concerning merger
control, our screening mechanism incidentally lends itself to an equivalent and
appealing signaling-like interpretation: notwithstanding that competition laws do
not currently allow antitrust agencies to explicitly fix the price of divestitures, the
latter might nevertheless reveal eﬃciency gains. More precisely, a more eﬃcient
merged entity will accept a lower price for any given level of divestiture than a
less eﬃcient one, and by doing so it will signal itself as such.
Our model builds on a simple framework, which nevertheless allows a con-
sistent formal treatment of both eﬃciency gains and structural remedies. We
consider a Cournot competition game with homogenous good, constant marginal
costs and capacity constraints in a three-firm framework. Following a two-firm
exogenous merger, the merged entity may enjoy cost savings. The latter stem
from the eﬃciency gains brought about by the merger. The CA requires in turn
asset transfers to the outsider, so as to fulfill its objective. Divestitures alter the
distribution of capital assets between firms and thereby the capacity constraints
7See the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.
8See the Commission notice on remedies acceptable under merger regulation, OJEC 2.3.2001.
9The Wall Street Journal Europe, May 26, 2005.
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and merger profitability for firms in the industry. We look for the optimal transfer
to implement according to the objective of the CA: maximizing total welfare un-
der the constraint that the Consumers’ Surplus does not fall. ((In our framework
with capacity constraints, the same transfer will keep the market price constant.
We show that the first best divestiture will be proportional to the level of cost
savings, meaning that less eﬃcient mergers will need to divest more. But as the
cost savings are private information for merging partners (also called insiders), the
latter are likely to cheat when declaring the amount of eﬃciency gains generated
by the merger, so as to avoid higher asset transfers. Thus the divestiture alone
will not be eﬀective as a screening device.
We argue here that a non linear tariﬀ for the divested assets can be employed
as a screening device. More specifically, we consider a two-type model, where the
insiders are either highly eﬃcient (low-cost) or poorly eﬃcient (high-cost). We
show that the first best divestiture contract that the CA proposes to the merged
entity consists of a menu of two tariﬀs. The first tariﬀ consists of a lower divestiture
for a lower average sale price than the second one. The eﬃcient merged entity
values its capacity more than the ineﬃcient one does. As a result, the low-cost
insiders are more reluctant to divest a large quantity of assets than the high-cost
insiders, even though the corresponding monetary transfer is high. By the same
token, since assets have lower value for the ineﬃcient merged firm, the latter will
find it profitable to divest a large quantity of assets for a higher average price.
In other words, the CA clears the merger provided the merged entity pays a
"licence to merge", although not to the CA, we should stress, since the monetary
transfer actually takes place between the insiders and the buyer of divested assets.
The optimal licence schedule proposed by the CA takes two forms. The firms pay
either by divesting a large quantity of assets, or by divesting a low quantity of
assets at a depreciated price. Hence the licence is either a monetary payment
whenever few assets are divested at a low price, or an asset payment whenever a
large quantity of assets is divested. Facing this two possible types of licences to
merge, the more eﬃcient merged entity is induced to choose the least distorting
form of payment, the monetary one. Basically, we provide an answer to Rey’s
(2000) informal suggestion that ”The firms could be asked to ’pay’ [...] for any
negative external eﬀect of the merger, so as to ensure that only socially desirable
mergers are proposed". The eﬀectiveness of the sale price as a screening device
(which is what basically our model shows) reveals that it can be successfully be
employed by merging firms to signal their eﬃciency gains. Notwithstanding the
reluctance of competition authorities to openly interfere with the pricing of the
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divested assets, close attention should be paid to the asset prices as they result
from the divestiture process, since they may very well signal the merger synergies.
As early as 1993, Yao and Dahdouh clearly stated that "In merger review, the
selective provision of information creates problems for government antitrust oﬃ-
cials because much relevant information is held privately by merging parties" (Yao
and Dahdouh (1993), p.24). The asymmetric information problem for competition
policy has been already tackled by Faulli-Oller and Corchon (1999), who study
the implementation of socially optimal mergers with standard tools in dominant
strategy implementation, but without allowing for merger remedies.
To our knowledge, few papers deal with structural merger remedies. Our model
takes on Rey (2000) and Gonzalez (2003), who both account for the possibility of
divestitures, besides their corrective role, to be used for screening. As compared
with Gonzalez (2003), whose incentive mechanism relies on the choice of the mar-
ket where the divestiture will apply if accepted, we restrict the use of divestiture
to the same market on which the competitive harm is witnessed, and propose a
second revelation instrument, the sale price. Medvedev (2004) proposed the first
formalization of the intuition that the amount of asset transfer necessary to rem-
edy the competitive harm depends on the amount of eﬃciency gains. We show in
turn that this result can be obtained within a quite general framework with con-
stant marginal costs, without assuming a particular relationship (substitutability
in his case) between the capital-based cost-savings and the synergies following the
merger.
This paper also belongs to a strand of literature analyzing the eﬀects of capital
transfers between firms. For instance, Farrell and Shapiro (1990,a) raise precisely
the question of how capital transfers between Cournot oligopolists aﬀect total
industry profit or welfare. Compte et al. (2002) and Vasconcelos (2005,a) also
look into the eﬀects of asset transfers, but from a collusive industry point of view,
whereas Vasconcelos (2005,b) models the CA’s incentives to apply divestitures
within an overfixing yet symmetric information merger control framework. We
completely overlook the possibility for collusion, but focus only on the unilateral
eﬀects of the concentration.
We present first the market equilibria both before and after merger, taking
simultaneously into account eﬃciency gains as well as asset transfers. We then
go on to present the game between industry firms and the CA. For the design of
optimal remedies, we begin by the symmetric information benchmark, then deal
with the asymmetric information framework. Finally, we comment our results and
conclude on their relevance. Technical proofs are grouped in the Appendix.
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2. The model
We present first the pre-merger equilibrium as a benchmark and then the
post-merger framework.
2.1. Pre-merger market equilibrium
We consider as starting point a homogenous good, three-firm perfectly sym-
metric industry. Demand is linear: P (Q) = 1−Q, where Q is total output. Firms
maximize individual profit. We place ourselves in a situation where firms face
capacity constraints as in Dixit (1980). Explicitly, we assume that a two-stage
capacity-quantity game took place before merger, where firms acquire first ca-
pacity at a positive unit cost ck and then compete à la Cournot with a constant
production marginal cost equal to c. The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of such
a game is given by capacity and output equal to 1−c−ck
4
. We take this to be the
operational capacity of a firm before merger and denote it by k. Consequently,
pre-merger equilibrium yields Q = 3k and P (3k) = 1 − 3k. We denote Π the
pre-merger individual profit, which writes Π = k(1− 3k− c). We assume that the
unit cost for the acquisition of additional capacity is prohibitive in the short-run.
2.2. Post-merger market framework
Since we only deal with exogenous market concentration, and that initially
the three firms are identical, merger is assumed to take place between any two of
them. We shall index the merged entity, i.e. the insiders, by M , and the outsider
by o respectively.
Following the merger, M ’s capacity constraint changes, since now it holds the
double of the pre-merger capacity. As far as the outsider is concerned, its capacity
is unchanged, as well as its marginal cost. The insiders in turn may benefit from
merger-specific cost savings10. More precisely, the marginal cost of the merged
firm, denoted cM , satisfies the following: cM = c − α, where α ∈ [0, c] measures
the amount of cost savings. Our framework is general enough to lend itself to
diﬀerent interpretations of this parameter. For instance, α stands for the synergies
that arise from the merger, i.e. substantial eﬃciency gains that would not have
been obtained without it. More generally, α measures the positive eﬀect of an
essential complementarity between the merger partners that allows them to lower
10Our treatment of cost savings involves the marginal cost, so as to consistently follow the
current CAs’ treatment of allowable merger eﬃciency gains.
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their common marginal cost11. Following Röller et al. (2000), these synergies
can typically be due to complementarity between technological or administrative
capabilities of firms. For example, firms may own complementary patents, which
if employed together further improve the production process.
In the post-merger framework, firms play a standard Cournot game - we rule
out in our model any possibility for post-merger collusion. Firms obey the fol-
lowing capacity constraints12: qM ≤ 2k and qo ≤ k. Taking into account the
cost savings for the merged entity, their Best Reply functions write as follows:
BRM(qo) = min
¡
1+α−c−qo
2
, 2k
¢
and BRo(qM) = min
³
1−c−qM
2
, k
´
. It is straight-
forward to show that post-merger equilibrium price is less or equal to P (3k) only
if α ≥ 5k − 1 + c. In other words, a merger increases market price whenever its
cost savings fail to exceed this minimum threshold.
To sum up, mergers have an ambiguous impact on the economy. Indeed, if
the eﬃciency gains are suﬃciently high, the merged entity is induced to use all its
capacity and thus the price is unchanged with respect to its pre-merger level. In
turn, with lower eﬃciency gains, the insiders hold slack capacity and the price is
higher than its pre-merger level. In such a case, divestitures might be used by the
CA to modify the post-merger market equilibrium so as to prevent any drop in
Consumers’ Surplus. These divestitures depend on the eﬃciency gains, and their
design is studied in the next section.
3. Remedies as a screening device
3.1. Objective of merger control and terms of divestiture
As far as the CA’s objective goes, we wish to closely follow the current trend
in merger control in as much as we assume total welfare maximization under the
constraint of no drop in Consumers’ Surplus. Competition Authorities actually
rather accept or reject mergers on the basis of the likelihood of a price increase.
To put it short, a merger is approved if consumers will not be hurt. However,
due to our modeling choice of capacity constraints, keeping the price constant is
the best that can be done, so maximizing Consumers’ Surplus is equivalent to
11For an explicit modeling of cost savings through the use of complementary assets by merger
partners see Bensaid et al. (1994)
12We consider here that in the short run firms cannot increase their production capacity. This
result remains true as long as the unit cost of capacity acquisition ck is high enough, which is
precisely our assumption here.
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requiring the above constraint to bind13.
We use a two-type model, with the synergy parameter α ∈ {α, α}, where α
stands for high eﬃciency gains, and α for low eﬃciency gains. Explicitly, α =
c− cM and α = c− cM , where cM and cM are the marginal costs of the low-cost
merged firm and of the high-cost one respectively. Objective probabilities are ρ
and 1− ρ respectively.
In our setting, divestitures will consist in transfers of assets to the outsider,
whom we consider here to be the only possible buyer. We make this hypothesis
for the sake of simplicity, but the framework lends itself well to the introduction
of a new entrant on the market14. Moreover, by not allowing entry on the market,
we want to remind that besides capacity, a certain know-how and experience of
the market are necessary to guarantee actual competition on behalf of the buyer
of divested assets.
We determine first the optimal divestiture when information on the merger
type is symmetric, and then go on to study the role of asymmetric information
for the design of the remedy.
3.2. Optimal divestitures with symmetric information
Given the screening stand we take in our model, the game we consider between
the firms and the CA is the following:
In the first stage, the merging firms learn their eﬃciency gains level α
and submit a merger proposal to the CA. When information is symmetric the
parameter α is also observed by the outsider and by the CA. (Later on we detail
the information structure of the game with asymmetric information).
In the second stage, the CA evaluates the consequences of the merger
taking into account its own merger control objective. It proposes a divestiture
contract accordingly, if such a contract exists; if not, it rejects the merger.
In the third stage, the insiders accept or reject the divestiture. If they
accept, assets will be transferred to the outsider on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
In the fourth stage, the outsider decides whether to take over or not the
divested assets.
13See also theoretical contributions supporting the choice of a pure Consumers’ Surplus stan-
dard instead of the Total Welfare one, such as Besanko and Spulber (1993), Neven and Röller
(2001), and Lyons (2002).
14This would nevertheless go beyond the primary purpose of our model, since it would require
the specification of the entrants’ marginal cost and a detailed case discussion to determine then
the optimal asset buyer from the CA’s pont of view.
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In the fifth stage, conditional on the divestiture contract being accepted,
the Cournot market equilibrium is determined taking into account the amount of
asset transfer required by the CA. If any of the parties rejects the contract, the
merger project falls through.
This last assumption is quite in line with the current unfolding of a divestiture
negotiation process. Indeed, whenever a divestiture injunction is being settled
upon, it has previously gained approval of all involved parties: the divesting firms,
the buyer, and the CA. The failure of such a three-party negotiation ends either
in the appointment of a trustee to carry out the divestiture, or in the merger itself
falling through.
At the last stage of the game, firms play a standard Cournot game. Note
that before the divestiture requested by the CA, firms’ capacities amount to 2k
for M and k for o. Once the transfer of ∆ is made from M to o, firms obey the
following capacity constraints: qM ≤ 2k − ∆ and qo ≤ k + ∆. Taking into ac-
count both the cost savings and the required divestiture, the Best Reply functions
of the Cournot game write as follows: BRM(qo) = min
¡
1+α−c−qo
2
, 2k −∆
¢
and
BRo(qM) = min
³
1−c−qM
2
, k +∆
´
.
Profits are denoted ΠM (∆;α) and Πo (∆;α) respectively, and depend on the
cost savings parameter and the amount of divestiture.
Actually, for a given divestiture 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ (1− c)− 4k, i.e. not too high so as
to have the outsider operate at full capacity, profits write
ΠM (∆;α) =
½ ¡
1+α−c−k−∆
2
¢2
, if α ≤ 5k −∆− (1− c)
(1− 3k − c+ α) (2k −∆), if α > 5k −∆− (1− c)
and Πo (∆;α) =
½ ¡
1−α−c−k−∆
2
¢
(k +∆) , if α ≤ 5k −∆− (1− c)
(1− 3k − c) (k +∆), if α > 5k −∆− (1− c)
Clearly, when the eﬃciency gains are high enough ( i.e. α > 5k−∆− (1− c)),
the merged firm is also led to employ all of its capacity.
However, if the divestiture exceeds the threshold above mentioned, regardless
of the level of merger synergies, the outsider will never operate to full capacity.
Thus, for ∆ > (1− c)− 4k,
ΠM (∆;α) =
µ
1 + 2α− c− 2k +∆
2
¶
(2k −∆)
and Πo (∆;α) =
µ
1− c− 2k +∆
2
¶2
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At stage four, as far as the outsider is concerned, the decision to accept to
take over the divested assets depends on his willingness to pay for them, equal
to Πo (∆;α) − Π. We denote by P the price of divestitures proposed by the
merged entity and observed by the CA. The outsider accepts the divested assets
iﬀ Πo (∆;α)− P ≥ Π.
At the stage before (stage three), the insiders make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer
to the outsider. Thus if the assets are transferred to the outsider, the insiders set
a price equal to the outsider maximum willingness to pay: P = Πo (∆;α) − Π.
Moreover, the merged entity agrees to divest iﬀ ΠM (∆;α) + P ≥ 2Π.
At the second stage, since the CA observes the type of the merger submitted
for approval, it makes its decision based on the following programme:
max
∆≥0
W (∆;α) (S)
s.t.



CS(∆;α) = CS0
ΠM (∆;α) + P ≥ 2Π
Πo (∆;α)−Π = P
where CS0 stands for the Consumers’ Surplus level before merger. Since the Con-
sumers’ Surplus constraint is binding, we will denote by ∆FB (α) the solution of
this programme, which is the lowest positive asset transfer that ensures produc-
tion at full capacity on behalf of both firms15. We remind that the market price
increases whenever firms hold slack capacity. Thus, successful remedies in our
context are necessarily those that make firms produce up to their full capacity.
However, given that total capacity in the industry is fixed, firms can never produce
more than they did before merger. Consequently, in our framework, maximizing
consumers’ surplus after merger and keeping it constant are equivalent. Finally,
the positivity constraint of this programme simply states that whenever there is
no asset transfer able to keep constant the price, the merger is rejected.
We characterize the First Best asset transfers as follows:
Lemma 1. (i) For k ∈
³
2(1−c)
9
, 2−c
9
´
, there exists a threshold bα = 9k − 2(1− c),bα ∈ (0, c), such that:
• for any α ≥ bα, the merger is accepted with divestiture ∆FB(α), where
∆FB(α) = max(0, 5k − α− (1− c)). Also, ∆FB (α) < ∆FB (α).
15According to the competition policy theory and practice, merger remedies are to be the
slightest modification possible that is able to restore market competition.
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• for any α < bα, the merger is rejected.
(ii) For k ≤ 2(1−c)
9
, bα ≤ 0, therefore all mergers are accepted with ∆FB(α)
(iii) For k ≥ 2−c
9
, bα ≥ c and therefore all mergers are rejected.
Whenever the divestitures ∆FB (α) and ∆FB (α) exist, the assets are trans-
ferred to the outsider at prices equal to PFB = (P (3k)− c) ·∆FB(α) and PFB =
(P (3k)− c) ·∆FB(α) respectively.
See proof in the Appendix.
The threshold bα corresponds to the shut-down limit. In the case where this
threshold is zero, for all mergers there exists a positive transfer such that the CA’s
objective is fulfilled. In the last case (case (iii)) the shutdown range covers the
whole interval, so there are no transfers that can make both firms operate to full
capacity. Henceforth we shall only consider k ∈
³
2(1−c)
9
, 2−c
9
´
, so as to deal with
an interesting case16.
This lemma shows that our mechanism replicates the outcome of CAs’ behavior
to the extent that merger control decisions obey threshold criteria. Here, whenever
the notified merger does not generate enough cost savings, the CA rejects it.
Moreover, if firms anticipate the CA’s decision making process, only eﬃciently
enough mergers will be proposed, and therefore all submitted mergers shall be
accepted. This is a self selection eﬀect. In turn, if α < bα, no merger is submitted.
Henceforth we shall consider only the case where α > bα.
Finally, the required transfer is higher for the less eﬃcient merger. The reason
is quite simple: in this model with fixed total capacity, for the price to be kept
constant, firms need to produce to their full capacity. But the more eﬃciency gains
it generates, the more capacity will employ the merged entity. Therefore, more
eﬃcient insiders hold less slack capacity, so the price increase will be lower for a
more eﬃcient merger, and the corresponding divestiture as well. This conforms
with the proportionality principle advocated by competition policy practitioners,
and justifies the fact that the average sale price of divested assets is actually
constant, since P
FB
∆FB(α) =
PFB
∆FB(α) . Nevertheless, such a proportionality principle
is subject to an implementation problem if eﬃciency gains captured here by the
parameter α are not observed by the CA.
16If the industry capacity is large enough, a duopoly is never induced to produce at full
capacity even if the cost of M is zero, whereas if the capacity is low enough, a duopoly always
produces at full capacity, even without eﬃciency gains.
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3.3. Optimal divestitures with asymmetric information: a regulated sale
price mechanism
The game with asymmetric information is basically the same as before, taking
into account the changes due to the inobservability of the merger type:
In the first stage, the merging firms learn their eﬃciency level and submit
a merger proposal to the CA. The parameter α is now private information of the
merging firms, but the latter may or may not report it truthfully.
In the second stage, the CA evaluates the consequences of the merger
taking into account its own merger control objective. It proposes a divestiture
contract accordingly, if such a contract exists; if not, it rejects the merger. The
divestiture contract will contain the amount os assets to be divested ∆ and the
corresponding sale price P .
In the third stage, the insiders accept or reject the divestiture. If they
accept, assets will be transferred to the outsider at the price P determined by the
CA.
In the fourth stage, the outsider, having observed the insiders’ choice to
accept or not the divestiture contract, decides whether to take over or not the
divested assets.
In the fifth stage, conditional on the divestiture contract being accepted,
the Cournot market equilibrium is determined taking into account the amount of
asset transfer required by the CA. The merger is abandoned whenever one of the
parties rejects the contract.
Note that the CA and the outsider have a common prior on the merger’s types
(ρ and 1−ρ). At stage four, the outsider observes the menu of contracts proposed
by the CA as well as the contract chosen by the merged entity and thus revises
its prior beliefs.
Following the revelation principle we restrict to truthful direct revelation mech-
anisms, and look for a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game.
When information is asymmetric and the only instrument employed is the
asset transfer, the CA is no longer able to make the insiders reveal truthfully
their eﬃciency level, i.e. their type, since they always choose the lowest level of
divestitures that is proposed. Indeed, should the CA propose the former levels of
divestiture (∆FB(α) and ∆FB(α)), associated with the previous First Best prices,
i.e. equal to the outsider’s willingness to pay, we can show that the high-cost
merged firm has incentives to choose the low asset transfer destined to the low-
cost merged entity. Explicitly, the following holds:
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ΠM(∆FB (α) ;α) +Πo(∆FB (α) ;α)−Π| {z }
=PFB
< ΠM(∆FB(α);α) +Πo(∆FB(α);α)−Π| {z }
=PFB
See proof in the Appendix.
In other words, given the first best levels of divestitures, mimicking is more
profitable than truth-telling for the less eﬃcient type. Indeed, when optimal
divestitures are sold for a price equal to the outsider’s willingness to pay (PFB
or PFB), the less eﬃcient merged entity prefers the lower asset transfer, which
allows it to hold spare capacity and thus increase its profit by means of a price
raise. As a result, in order to induce truthful revelation, a second instrument is
needed.
We model here a CA regulating the monetary transfer between the insiders
and the outsiders that accompanies the asset takeover. In case this instrument
should trigger the critique that the CA behaves as a sheer market regulator, we
claim that it is worth analyzing it for three main reasons. Firstly, it allows us
to test its theoretical relevance for the merger control. Secondly, because the
frontier between pure regulation and merger control has already been blurred by
the very use of structural divestitures, which are basically meant to modify the
market structure (see Motta et al. (2004)). After all, "introducing the possibility
of remedies ... puts the merger control oﬃce in a position close to that of an
industry specific regulator" - Rey (2003, p.130). Thirdly, regulating asset prices
already concerns other competition-related fields than pure sector regulation, such
as intellectual property rights, where the price of the licence would be set by the
Patent Oﬃce17.
The incentive contract fixed by the CA will thus contain a given sale price P
for an amount of divested assets ∆. Two Incentive Constraints (IC) are added
to the programme of the CA to induce revelation of information. Hence, the
programme of the CA writes:
17Such a "buy out" mechanism is formally analyzed in Llobet et al. (2001).
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max
{(∆,P ),(∆,P )}
∆≥0,∆≥0
ρW (∆;α) + (1− ρ)W
¡
∆;α
¢
(AS)
s.t.



CS (∆;α) = CS
¡
∆;α
¢
= CS0
ΠM (∆;α) + P ≥ ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+ P
ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+ P ≥ ΠM (∆;α) + P
ΠM (∆;α) + P ≥ 2Π
ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+ P ≥ 2Π
Πo (∆;α)− P ≥ Π
Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
− P ≥ Π
where the contracts (∆;P ) and
¡
∆;P
¢
are destined for types α and α respec-
tively.
Note that unlike a standard screening programme, there is no direct transfer
between the agent and the principal. Instead, the CA fixes the monetary transfer
between the agent and a third party, the outsider, and uses it as an incentive
device. The lump-sum transfer between firms does not aﬀect total industry profit,
and is diﬀerent from the suggestion of Röller et al. (2000) to introduce an explicit
licence to merge, to the extent that in our model the monetary transfer does not
benefit directly the CA. In this way we actually avoid the direct implication of
the CA in the merger process as an explicit regulator, although the revelation
mechanism is indeed based on the taxation principle.
Note equally that since the contract we look for induces information revelation,
i.e. separation of types, in equilibrium the priors of the outsider necessarily coin-
cide with its revised beliefs. As in the symmetric information configuration, CA
employs a supplementary choice variable to solve the screening problem, namely
the shut-down policy (i.e. refuse the merger of the less eﬃcient type), hence the
positivity constraints on the asset transfers. Finally, the equality constraints on
Consumers’ Surplus as well as the participation constraints correspond actually
to a three-party negotiation. Indeed, the additional instrument we propose to
screen mergers, namely the sale price of the divested assets, is merely a lump-
transfer between the outsider and the insiders, hence it stands for a particular
distribution of total industry profit. To achieve screening, the contracts proposed
by the CA need to ensure the industry firms’ participation. Thus, the above pro-
gramme is actually designed to make the industry parties involved agree on the
incentive-compatible sharing of their total profit.
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Before presenting the optimal contract we give the following lemma:
Lemma 2. For any ∆ < ∆, ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
> ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
.
See proof in the Appendix.
This inequality stands for a standard single crossing condition. It states that
the eﬃcient merged firm benefits more from a low asset divestiture than the in-
eﬃcient firm. In other words, the eﬃcient merged firm attaches more value to
capacity than the ineﬃcient one. The intuition goes as follows: following merger
and the ensuing increase in capacity, the eﬃcient insiders are always able to pro-
duce the same quantity as the ineﬃcient ones, and can thus guarantee themselves
the same revenue. Yet, thanks to the synergy cost reduction, their profit increase
is actually higher, hence their willingness to receive w.r.t. the monetary payment
of a given divestiture is lower. As in any standard Principal Agent model, this
lemma makes room for screening. We can therefore derive the optimal contract
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Denote (∆, P ) ,
¡
∆, P
¢
the divestiture contracts proposed with
asymmetric information when they exist. The solution of the programme (AS) is
such that:
(i) No shut-down
When α > bα, then∆ = ∆FB(α) and∆ = ∆FB(α). Prices are P = Πo(∆;α)−Π
and P = P −ΠM (∆;α) +ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
. Moreover, there exists a threshold eα such
that for α > eα, P < 0.
(ii) Shut-down of less eﬃcient type
When α < bα, type α merger is rejected by oﬀering a single contract: ∆ =
∆FB(α) and P = 2Π−ΠM (∆;α)
See proof in the Appendix.
The optimal contract has two main characteristics. First, there is no distortion
of asset divestitures and the merger clearance decision is unchanged as compared
with the case of symmetric information. Second, the price of the low divestiture is
distorted downwards, whereas the price of the high divestiture is not distorted at
all (meaning it still equals the outsider’s willingness to pay), so that the average
divestiture price increases now with the level of divestiture. To sum up, we obtain
no distortion at all in terms of asset transfers, and distortion ’at the top’ for the
monetary transfers.
The intuition behind the design of these contracts proceeds in two steps.
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First of all, we have previously emphasized that the CA must distort asset
prices and possibly divestiture levels so as to obtain separation of types. Other-
wise, both firms are induced to choose the low level of divestiture. Note however
that since the asset price is a lump-sum transfer between firms without impact
on the CA’s objective, the CA can distort prices at no cost, so as to induce the
ineﬃcient firm to choose the high divestiture.
Second, it remains to show that price distortion alone is suﬃcient to lead both
firms to choose the optimal levels of divestiture disclosed in Lemma 1. For that
purpose the CA must lower the price of the low level of divestitures so as to deter
the ineﬃcient firm from choosing such a contract. According to Lemma 2, a given
divestiture is more distorting for the eﬃcient merged firm than for the ineﬃcient
one, and thus we have seen that the willingness to receive for the First Best ∆
is lower for the eﬃcient entity. Hence we can find a price for this low level of
asset divestiture that induces the ineﬃcient entity to give it up, and this price
will consequently need to be lower than the outsider’s willingness to pay. To sum
up, it is enough to keep the price of the high First Best divestiture equal to the
outsider’s willingness to pay, and in turn to set for the low First Best divestiture
a price inferior to the outsider’s willingness to pay.
Moreover, in one particular configuration, the asset price can be negative, so
that the CA would require the eﬃcient firm to subsidize the outsider. Specifically,
if the eﬃcient firm has very substantial cost savings, the optimal level of divestiture
required to the eﬃcient firm is so low, that in order to prevent the ineﬃcient
merged firm from choosing it, the corresponding distortion on the sale price will
make it negative.
Finally, the CA might have to reject the less eﬃcient merger due to the ab-
sence of optimal divestiture, i.e. when α < bα. But, with asymmetric information
and not distorted prices, both types of insiders will submit their merger. Again,
to extract information, the CA will distort downwards the price for the low di-
vestiture, so as to incite the submission of the highly eﬃcient merger only. Point
(ii) of our Proposition actually gives the value of P that violates the participation
constraint of α, while still ensuring that of α. For this price, only the eﬃcient
merger will be submitted.
A low price of divested assets is often interpreted as a signal of failure of
the divestiture process. The European Commission’s Merger Remedies Study,
October 2005 (p.103), argues that "remedies were less eﬀective in at least three
divestiture cases where the purchaser had acquired the divested business for free,
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or at a negative price"18. We claim however that a more eﬃcient merger can signal
itself as such by accepting a low average asset price combined with low quantity
of assets divested, whereas an ineﬃcient merged firm reveals itself as such by
divesting a large quantity of assets for a high average price. In the present model,
the ineﬃcient entity owns more slack capacity and values assets less than the
eﬃcient one. This is the reason why the ineﬃcient insiders accept to divest a
larger quantity of assets, while the eﬃcient ones prefer a low price, provided that
the quantity of divested assets remains low. Hence, one way to interpret our result
is that a trustee appointed by the CA might tell an eﬃcient merger proposal from
an ineﬃcient one using such a non linear tariﬀ for asset divestitures.
Note that this mechanism bears no risk of ineﬃcient or distorting lobbying
activities on behalf of parties involved. Indeed, our programme is designed to make
all three parties agree on an incentive-compatible distribution of industry profit.
Thus, the more eﬃcient merged entity will transfer less assets at a depreciated
price, and the profit sharing is favourable to the outsider, who pays less than
his maximum willingness to pay. In other words, our mechanism has the initial
informational conflict between the CA and the insiders solved as soon as the
diverging interests of the insiders and the outsider are reconciled. Thus, by making
use of a three-party incentive-compatible negotiation, the CA can make sure that
no useless lobbying activities occur.
Within the debate on the frontier between competition policy and regulation,
our proposition is meant to draw attention to the best instruments that should be
used to address the anticompetitive eﬀects of merger. We argue that while price
distortion is considered as highly interventionist and prohibited in an orthodox
view of competition policy, in a merger control context the most distorting tool
is more likely to be the asset transfer, rather than a lump-sum monetary transfer
between industry firms. Indeed, whereas the monetary transfer does not aﬀect
market behavior of firms, the level of assets divested has a direct impact on firms’
production decisions. As a result, in order to induce firms to reveal eﬃciency
gains, the use of monetary transfer appears less interventionist than the transfer
of physical assets.
Our proposition suggests that firms be asked to pay a kind of licence to merge.
Indeed, the divestiture implies a cost imposed to the merged entity which will give
up some of its assets. The way it will pay to be allowed to merge depends on its
level of eﬃciency. Basically, the ineﬃcient merged firm pays by giving up assets,
18See also Farrell (2003), or the Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, by the
U.S. Department of Justice, October 2004.
19
whereas a very eﬃcient one pays by means of a monetary transfer to the outsider.
4. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the economic analysis of merger remedies. We pro-
pose a revelation mechanism allowing the design of optimal merger divestitures
when information is asymmetric between firms and the CA with respect to the
synergy generated by the merger. Our revelation mechanism replicates the typi-
cal behavior of a CA, namely decision making based on thresholds of announced
eﬃciencies. In our framework, shut-down of the least eﬃcient type is possible.
Basically, mergers will only be accepted if they generate enough synergies, and
this is what the merger control practically aims at.
Our results show that the sale price of divested assets is a powerful screening
device. Despite the information asymmetry, types are perfectly screened, and
only divestiture sale prices get distorted. Complete distortion, i.e. also aﬀecting
divestiture levels, would be possible in our framework if several modifications were
performed, such as introducing a no longer prohibitive cost of capacity acquisition,
or imposing a positivity constraint on asset sale prices.
We acknowledge of course the modelling of a CA actively modifying the market
structure, but then any structural merger remedy is precisely meant to do this.
Taking into account the reluctance of competition authorities to actually employ
this instrument for the screening of merger projects, we can nevertheless insist on
the ability of the price of divested assets to signal on behalf of merging partners
the eﬃciency potential of their merger.
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Appendix
Post-merger Cournot equilibrium. Successful Remedies:
These are the transfers for which both firms produce up to their post-merger
capacity: forM , 2k−∆, and for o, k+∆. Checking that the Best Reply function
yield in equilibrium precisely the post-merger capacities allows us to compute the
limits of the relevant range for the divestiture:
forM : BRM(qo = k+∆) = 1+α−c−(k+∆)
2
≥ 2k−∆⇔ ∆ ≥ 5k−α−(1−c) = ∆1
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for o: BRo(qM = 2k −∆) = 1−c−(2k−∆)
2
≥ k +∆⇔ ∆ ≤ (1− c)− 4k = ∆2
It is straightforward to check that for ∆ < ∆1, the outsider produces up to
its full capacity, but the merged firm holds slack capacity, whereas for ∆ > ∆2
the reverse is true. Note that ∆1 > 0 as long as α ≤ 5k − (1 − c), a necessary
condition being k ≥ 1−c
5
so as to have positive cost savings.
Proof of Lemma 1. As seen before, successful remedies belong to [∆1,∆2],
with ∆1 = 5k − α − (1 − c). The First Best level of divestiture is actually ∆1,
since we take it to be the lowest positive asset transfer that satisfies the objective:
∆FB(α) = 5k − α− (1− c).
The existence of ∆FB (α) is ensured as long as the interval [∆1,∆2] exists.
Define bα as the threshold value of cost savings for which ∆1 = ∆2: bα = 9k −
2(1 − c). This threshold is positive provided that k ≥ 2(1−c)
9
. Whenever α < bα,
we have ∆1 > ∆2 therefore the CA rejects all mergers, since there is no transfer
∆ for which firms produce both to full capacity. In turn, for α ≥ bα, ∆FB(α) =
5k − α− (1− c) and since α > α we obtain directly ∆FB(α) < ∆FB(α).
Since assets are divested to the outsider at its willingness to pay, prices are
given by: PFB = Πo(∆FB(α);α)−Π = (P (3k)−c)∆FB(α) and PFB = Πo(∆FB(α);α)−
Π = (P (3k)− c)∆FB(α).
Proof - incentive to mimick.
ΠM(∆FB(α);α) +Πo(∆FB(α);α)−Π| {z }
=PFB
≤ ΠM(∆FB(α);α) +Πo(∆FB(α);α)−Π| {z }
=PFB
⇔ [P (3k)− c+ α] · ¡2k −∆FB(α)¢+ [P (3k)− c] · ¡k +∆FB(α)¢ <£
P (k +∆FB(α) +BRMα (k +∆FB(α)))− c+ α
¤ ·BRMα (k +∆FB(α))
− [P (3k)− c] · ¡k +∆FB(α)¢
⇔ [P (3k)− c] · ¡∆FB(α)−∆FB(α)¢ <£
P (k +∆FB(α) +BRMα (k +∆FB(α)))− c+ α
¤ ·BRMα (k +∆FB(α))
− [P (3k)− c+ α] · ¡2k −∆FB(α)¢
⇔ (1− 3k − c) · (α− α) <
µ
1− 3k − c+ α+ α
2
¶2
− (1− 3k − c+ α)2
⇔ 1
4
(α− α) · (α+ 3α) < 0 which is true since 0 ≤ α < α
Proof of Lemma 2. A necessary condition for the two incentives constraints
to hold is ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
> ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
.
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The profit of the merged firm writes generally as follows:
ΠM (∆;α) =
£
P (k +∆+BRM(k +∆)− c+ α
¤ ·BRM(k +∆)
where BRM(k +∆) = min
³
1+α−c−(k+∆)
2
, 2k −∆
´
We show next that ∂Π
M (∆;α)
∂∆ < 0 and
∂2ΠM (∆;α)
∂∆∂α < 0
• Show ∂ΠM (∆;α)∂∆ < 0
∂ΠM (∆;α)
∂∆ =
∂BRM
∂∆ ·
£
P (k +∆+BRM(k +∆)− c+ α
¤
+BRM(k +∆) · ∂P (k +∆+BR
M(k +∆))
∂∆
Note that ∂BR
M
∂∆ < 0 always, and that
∂P (k+∆+BRM (k+∆))
∂∆ ≤ 0.
Actually, if BRM(k +∆) = 2k −∆ then P (k +∆+BRM(k +∆)) = P (3k)
therefore ∂P (k+∆+BR
M (k+∆))
∂∆ = 0,
whereas if BRM(k + ∆) = 1+α−c−(k+∆)
2
then P (k + ∆ + BRM(k + ∆)) =
1+c−α−k−∆
2
and thus ∂P (k+∆+BR
M (k+∆))
∂∆ < 0
To sum up, ∂Π
M (∆;α)
∂∆ < 0
• Show ∂2ΠM (∆;α)∂∆∂α < 0
∂2ΠM (∆;α)
∂∆∂α =
∂
∂α
³
∂ΠM (∆;α)
∂∆
´
=
∂2BRM
∂α∂∆| {z }
=0
· £P (k +∆+BRM(k +∆)− c+ α¤+
+
∂BRM
∂∆| {z }
<0
· ∂
£
P (k +∆+BRM(k +∆)− c+ α
¤
∂α| {z }
>0
+
∂BRM
∂α| {z }
≥0
· ∂P (k +∆+BR
M(k +∆))
∂∆| {z }
≤0
+
+BRM(k +∆) · ∂
2P (k +∆+BRM(k +∆))
∂∆∂α| {z }
≤0
Conclusion: since α > α, the cross derivative ∂
2ΠM (∆;α)
∂∆∂α < 0 yields equivalently
∂
∂α
³
∂ΠM (∆;α)
∂∆
´
< 0⇔ ∂ΠM (∆;α)∂∆ −
∂ΠM (∆;α)
∂∆ < 0
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⇔ ∂∂∆
¡
ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM (∆;α)
¢
< 0, ∀∆
⇔ for any ∆ < ∆, ΠM (∆;α) − ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
< ΠM (∆;α) − ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
, q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 1.
• No shut-down
For P = Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
−Π and P = Πo (∆;α)−Π, both firms prefer the contract
(∆, P ), since the following inequality holds for the ineﬃcient type:
ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
> ΠM (∆;α) +Πo (∆;α)
In turn, if P = 2Π−ΠM (∆;α) , then ΠM (∆;α) + P < ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+ P
so both firms prefer the contract (∆, P ).
By continuity of P , there exist P and P = Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
−Π with
Πo (∆;α)−Π ≥ P > 2Π−ΠM (∆;α)
such that ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
= P − P
This latter condition ensures that P−P > ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
, i.e. separation
of types, thanks to the single-crossing condition (see Lemma 2).
We show next there exists eα such that for α > eα, P < 0
First of all, note that for ∆ = 0, P < 0 necessarily, because:
P = P −
¡
ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢¢
= Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
−Π−
¡
ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢¢
= (P (3k)− c) · ¡k +∆¢− (P (3k)− c) · k
−
¡
(P (3k)− c+ α) · (2k −∆)− (P (3k)− c+ α) · ¡2k −∆¢¢
= (P (3k)− c) ·∆− (P (3k)− c+ α) ¡∆−∆¢
⇒ for ∆ = 0, this yields (P (3k)− c) ·∆− (P (3k)− c+ α)∆ < 0
Moreover, ∆ = 0⇔ 5k − α− (1− c) = 0⇔ α = 5k − (1− c)
To sum up, for α = 5k − (1− c) (which by the way is > bα), P < 0
But, for α = α, P = P , thus P > 0
Therefore, by continuity and monotonicity19 of P , there exists a eα > bα such
that for α > eα,P < 0
19It is straightforward to show that P is decreasing with α
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Last but not least, we can show that a suﬃcient condition for this thresholdeα to be < c is to have k < 1
5
, which is compatible with our condition for positive
cost savings, namely k ≥ 1−c
5
• Shut-down of less eﬃcient merger
When α < bα, the optimal response from the CA is to reject the α, simply
because it is the only way to keep the price constant - see Lemma 1, which
shows that when there is no transfer ∆ that can keep the price constant, the
CA rejects the merger. To prevent therefore the submission of the α merger,
it is enough to set P = 2Π − ΠM (∆;α), which violates the participation
constraint of the α type.
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